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IS THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
v. 
VICTOR ANTHONY MELENDREZ, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No, 950122-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant was convicted of murder, a first-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-203 (1995). Although defendant originally filed this appeal in the Utah Supreme 
Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(I) (Supp. 1994), that Court transferred the case 
to the Utah Court of Appeals under its pour-over authority. Therefore, this Court has 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1994). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did trial counsel provide defendant with ineffective assistance when he failed to move 
to suppress defendant's confession? 
Because defendant first raised this issue on appeal, the Court reviews his claim as a 
matter of law. State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES! ANP RULES 
Because no provisions are determinative to this case, they are not reproduced in this 
brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural History 
On September 23, 1994, a jury convicted defendant of Murder, a first-degree felony (r. 
81). For that conviction, the trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of five 
years to life in prison (r. 91) to run concurrently with a sentence for aggravated assault in a 
separate case (i$L). 
Statement of facts 
On February 17, 1994, defendant murdered Derral Bud Christensen. Christensen was 
a 63-year old man who lived with his cat and dog (r. 209). At the time of his death, he was in 
poor health, with emphysema and a partially paralyzed right hand and leg (r. 167-74; 212). 
Defendant stabbed Christensen 22 times in all, but the fatal injury came when defendant 
plunged the knife four inches into Christensen's chest and pierced his heart, causing an 
irreversible hemorrhage of blood into the space around the right side of the lung (r. 168). 
Unable to track down any leads in their investigation, the police were at a dead end 
until an anonymous citizen called and told Detective Shane Miner that defendant had killed 
Christensen (r. 229). In that telephone call, the citizen also gave a partial description of how 
the murder occurred, which fit in with some of the evidence Detective Miner found at the 
scene (r. 227-28). Based on this information, Miner began looking for defendant, and 
ultimately located him in Clovis, New Mexico, where he had moved a few weeks after the 
murder (r. 334). 
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Miner traveled to Clovis, where, in the company of the local police, he found the 
defendant (r. 335). Defendant agreed to come to the Clovis police station and Detective John 
Higget of the Clovis police department took him into an office, read him his rights, and asked 
if they could talk about some problems (r. 409). Rather than read defendant, who was 17 V4-
years old at the time, the typical Miranda warning, Higget read from a card specifically 
designed for use with individuals less than 18 years old (r. 410). This printed form listed the 
rights to which minors were entitled before undergoing questioning and also contained spaces 
for a defendant to put his initials to indicate his knowledge of the rights and to waive them 
(id.). In addition to informing defendant of his right to remain silent, Higget instructed 
defendant that he could talk to and have present at the questioning, a parent, legal guardian, or 
an attorney; that he could be appointed an attorney if he could not afford one; and that any 
statements he made could be used against him (r. 412). Defendant indicated that he 
understood his rights and also signed the waiver, indicating that he would talk to the police (r. 
414). For a few minutes, Higget talked to defendant about various matters, including how 
long he had been in Clovis, where he had resided previously, and what he was going to do in 
Clovis (r. 415-16). Higget also got the defendant a cup of coffee and took him to the 
bathroom (r. 416). The defendant was not handcuffed during the conversation (i$L). Higget 
then brought in Detective Minor, who introduced himself to the defendant and said he wanted 
to talk to defendant about an incident that happened in Utah (r. 418). 
During the course of Minor's questioning, defendant confessed to Christensen's murder 
(r. 423). At no time did he ask for a parent, guardian, or attorney (r. 420). As shown by 
exhibits at trial, defendant had considerable experience in the juvenile justice system (r. 476). 
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Prior to the murder, defendant had been housed at the MOWEDA youth detention facility and 
had run away from a group home; additionally, defendant was scheduled to go to trial for 
aggravated assault (r. 461-62). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant has failed to establish that by not moving to suppress defendant's confession, 
trial counsel was ineffective. To prove ineffective assistance, a defendant must show not only 
that the counsel's performance was deficient, but also that the deficiency was prejudicial to the 
defense. Here, defendant cannot even establish the first element of that test, i.e., deficiency of 
performance. On appeal, defendant argues that the State cannot use a minor's confession, 
under any circumstances, unless a parent, guardian, or attorney were present when the 
confession was made. The Utah Supreme Court already has rejected this per se rule, applying 
the "totality of the circumstances'' test to determine whether the individual knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his rights. 
Here, defendant acted knowingly and voluntarily when he confessed to the brutal 
murder of Derral Christensen. Defendant was only six months away from his 18th birthday 
and had a life independent from his parent. Additionally, defendant was familiar with police, 
probation officer, and courts. Not only had he lived in MOWEDA youth detention facility 
and a group home, but he was facing a trial on aggravated assault charges. The police 
informed defendant of his rights, including his right to have a parent or guardian present, and 
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived them and confessed. 
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ARGUMENT 
BECAUSE MELENDREZ' CONFESSION WAS NOT 
TAKEN IN VIOLATION OF MIRANPA V, ARIZONA, 
TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO REQUEST 
SUPPRESSION WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE. 
To establish that trial counsel's performance violated the sixth amendment's mandate 
for effective assistance of counsel, defendant must show: (1) the trial counsel's performance 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) the performance prejudiced the 
defendant. Strickland
 v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,667-68 (1984); State v, Strain, 885 P.2d 
810, 814 (Utah App. 1994). Although counsel must zealously defend his client's interest, he 
is not given free rein to make frivolous and meritless arguments. Codianna v Morris, 660 
P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983) (counsel's failure to make motions that would be futile if raised 
does not constitute ineffective assistance); Lilly v. Gilmore. 988 F.2d 783, 786 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(attorney not required to make meritless argument); Miller v. State. 830 P.2d 419, 428 (Wyo. 
1992). In this case, whether defendant's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance turns on 
the substantive merits of the proposed motion to suppress the confession. 
The Utah Supreme Court has expressly rejected defendant's proposed per se rule that a 
confession from a minor is unconstitutional unless a parent, guardian, or attorney was present. 
State v. Hunt. 607 P.2d 297, 300 (Utah 1980) (Addendum A). Following most other 
jurisdictions, the Court applied the "totality of the circumstances" test. I$L The admissibility 
of a confession depends not just on age, but also on intelligence and educational level, state of 
mind during the interrogation, and prior experience with the law and the justice system. fcL at 
300, 301; £££ also State v. Hegelman. 717 P.2d 1348, 1349 (Utah 1986) (defendant only two 
5 
months shy of 18th birthday at time of confession and had previously been involved in juvenile 
system); State in the interest of T.S.V.. 607 P.2d 827, 828 (Utah 1980) (confession properly 
used where 17-year old understood rights and had knowledge of the juvenile justice system). 
From a purely chronological perspective, defendant was indeed 17 years of age.1 Like 
the juvenile in Hunt, though, defendant had experience beyond his years dealing with police, 
probation officers, and courts (r. 461-62, 476). He had previously lived at MOWEDA 
detention facility and a group home (from which he escaped immediately prior to his flight to 
New Mexico) (id.). Further, defendant also was scheduled for a trial for aggravated assault, 
which was to have taken place in April 1994 (IJL) In psychological testing, Dr. Rick Hawks 
concluded that, although defendant had not progressed very far in school, he possessed a "high 
degree of maturity and independent life style" (r. 488). This is not a person so intimidated by 
adult authority that he needed an adult counterweight to protect him from the police. Indeed, 
this "boy" knew more about the criminal justice system, and undoubtedly had been subjected 
to more police interrogation, than most adults. To say that this defendant could not knowingly 
and voluntarily confess to a crime merely because of his age is to give talismanic significance 
to the 18th birthday. Because the Utah Supreme Court already has ruled that no such 
significance should be given to a birthday, and given the totality of the circumstances, a 
motion to suppress would have been fruitless and without merit. As the Wyoming Supreme 
Court said, a[l]ack of capacity to create miracles is not the test of ineffectiveness of criminal 
defense counsel." Miller v. State. 830 P.2d 419, 428 (Wyo. 1992). Therefore, because a 
1
 Having been born in October 1976, defendant was actually 17 V4 years old when he confessed to 
the murder on April 14, 1994 (r. 436). 
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motion to suppress would have been without merit, defendant's trial counsel cannot be faulted 
for refusing to file one. Lilly. 988 F.2d at 786. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction for murder should be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPTNTON NOT REQUESTED 
Because this case does not raise complicated or novel issues of law, the State does not 
request oral argument or a published opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS M2= day of May 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
JAMES H. BEADLES 
Assistant Attorney General 
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I certify that on the ]W day of May 1995,1 caused to be mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage 
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2568 Washington Boulevard, Suite 102 
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ADDENDUM 
[ 607 P.2d 297 State v. Hunt (Utah 1980) | 
State of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
Gilbert Hunt, Defendant and Appellant 
No. 16437 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
607 P.2d 297 
February 14,1980, Filed 
JUDGES 
WILKINS, Justice, wrote the opinion. WE CONCUR: J. Allan Crockett, Chief Justice, Richard J. 
Maughan, Justice, Gordon R. Hall, Justice, I. Daniel Stewart, Justice. 
AUTHOR: WILKINS 
OPINION 
WILKINS, Justice Defendant, at the age of 16 years and 11 months, was certified by the 
Juvenile Court for Utah County to be tried as an adult on a charge of aggravated robbery. 
Thereafter, defendant was tried before the District Court for Utah County, sitting with a jury, 
which returned a verdict of guilty for violating Section 76-6-302, Utah Code Ann. 1953, as 
amended. * Defendant appeals. 
On November 12, 1978, a man entered a gasoline service station in Springville, Utah, 
wearing a nylon stocking loosely over his head, and pointed a gun, with silencer attached, at the 
owner of the station. He demanded and took all the money in the till. The owner recognized the 
man as the defendant, whom she had known for some time. At the time of these events defendant 
was a fugitive, having escaped from the Utah Youth Development Center. 
Approximately one month later, defendant was arrested in Colorado and held there until he 
was transported back to this State by Utah County Police Offices. During the six and one-half 
hour drive to Utah, an Officer Sharp advised defendant of his constitutional rights by reading a 
"Miranda"^ card, and asked defendant if he understood these rights, and if he wanted to answer 
questions. Defendant responded affirmatively, and thereafter made statements to the officers 
which connected him with the crime in Springville. 
At the trial, Officer Sharp testified, relating the statements made by defendant. Defendant 
made no objection to this testimony on direct examination. Instead, on cross examination, 
defendant established that his parents or guardian had not been contacted and no one other than 
defendant had waived his "Miranda" rights prior to the time the statements were made. Defense 
counsel then moved to strike the officer's testimony on that basis, which motion was denied. 
Defendant now appeals, citing as error, the admission of this testimony, contending that a 
juvenile's confessions and admissions against his interest are inherently involuntary when made 
without the advice of a parent, adult friend or an attorney, regardless of the Miranda warnings.^ 
Secondly, defendant contends that the interrogation by the police during the six and one-half 
hour journey from Colorado constitutes a violation of Section 78-3a-29, noted infra, and renders 
any statements made by the juvenile during that time inadmissible. Finally, defendant argues that 
until he was certified to be tried as an adult, defendant was under the jurisdiction of the Juvenile 
Court, and statements made by him during that time are inadmissible as a matter of fundamental 
fairness, and should have been excluded under Section 78-3a-44(3). 
(c) 1992-1995 by The Michie Company 
The facts of this case are similar to those in State v. Mares, 113 Utah 225, 192 P.2d 861 
(1948), where this Court considered the admissibility of a confession made by a minor. In that 
case, Mares, at the age of 18 was arrested and charged with theft of an automobile, and later, 
murder. Mares admitted the theft to the Summit County Attorney who thereupon advised Mares 
that he should not make any admissions to him but should wait until Mares' father, mother, or a 
lawyer was present. Mares said he did not want a lawyer and did not want his father or mother 
notified. The next day, Mares was interrogated by two F.B.I, agents, who told Mares that he did 
not have to make any statements to them and that any statement he made would be used against 
him in a court of law. Mares consented to answer their questions, and during the four and 
one-half hour interrogation, confessed to the murder. 
The evidence did not show any abuse, threats, coercion, or promises of reward or immunity 
on the part of the interrogating officers, but Mares contended that his confession was involuntary 
because of his youth, and coercion existed because of the length of the interrogation, the number 
of officers who were present, and the fact that Mares made the confession without the benefit of 
counsel. In light of Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) in which the U.S. Supreme Court stated 
that a child (there a fifteen year old) "is an easy victim of the law and cannot be judged by the 
more exacting standards of maturity," this Court considered Mares1 contention and held that 
considering the facts and circumstances of the case, Mares was not made a victim of fear or panic 
or an object of police abuses, was not offered immunity, reward or consideration, was not denied 
his freedom of choice, and the confession was therefore voluntary. 
The same circumstances are present in this case, and Mares would seem to be controlling 
here on the issue of whether the confession of a juvenile is inherently involuntary and 
inadmissible. 
But defendant asserts that more recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court sustain his 
contention that juvenile confessions are inherently involuntary. We therefore must determine 
whether the reasoning of Mares withstands scrutiny in the light of recent developments in this 
area. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has considered this issue in a number of cases since 1948, and has 
said: 
If counsel was not present for some permissible reason when an admission was obtained, the 
greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that 
it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of 
adolescent fantasy, fright or despair. [ In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) at page 56.] 
Gault was not advised of his constitutional rights as was defendant in this case, but a simple 
application of Miranda does not finally resolve the question, as the U.S. Supreme Court has also 
held youthful confessions involuntary in spite of the fact that the child was advised of his rights 
to the same extent as would be considered sufficient were he an adult. In Guallegos v, Colorado, 
370 U.S. 49 (1962) where the defendant was only 14 years of age, the Court said: 
The prosecution says that the youth and immaturity of the petitioner and the five-day 
detention are irrelevant, because the basic ingredients of the confessions came tumbling out as 
soon as he was arrested. But if we took that position, it would, with all deference, be in callous 
disregard of this boy's constitutional rights. He cannot be compared with an adult in full 
possession of his senses and knowledgeable of the consequences of his admissions. He would 
have no way of knowing what the consequences of his confession were without advice as to his 
rights-from someone concerned with securing him those rights-and without the aid of more 
mature judgment as to the steps he should take in the predicament in which he found himself. A 
(c) 1992-1995 by The Michic Company 
lawyer or an adult relative or friend could have given the petitioner the protection which his own 
immaturity could not. Adult advice would have put him on a less unequal footing with his 
interrogators. Without some adult protection against this inequality, a 14-year old boy would not 
be able to know, let alone assert, such constitutional rights as he had. [370 U.S. at 54] 
Defendant contends that a proper interpretation of Gallegos requires the exclusion by the 
Court of all statements made by a juvenile if made without the advice of a parent, adult friend or 
an attorney. We are not persuaded, however, that a child is necessarily incompetent to waive his 
rights because of his infancy^; nor do we agree that such a choice should lie with a child's parent, 
adult friend or attorney. The question of whether a juvenile has intelligently, knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his constitutional rights must be determined from all of the circumstances of a 
particular case, as the Court held, in Gallegos: 
There is no guide to the decision of cases such as this, except the totality of circumstances 
that bear on the two factors we have mentioned. The youth of the petitioner, the long detention, 
the failure to send for his parents, the failure immediately to bring him before the judge of the 
Juvenile Court, the failure to see to it that he had the advice of a lawyer or a friend-all these 
combine to make us conclude that the formal confession on which this conviction may have 
rested (see Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568) was obtained in violation of due process. [370 
U.S. at 55] 
Defendant argues that several jurisdictions have adopted the rule that a juvenilis waiver of 
his right of silence is invalid per se, unless made with the advice of his parent, adult friend or 
attorney.^ But, we believe, the better reasoned cases are those from the great majority of 
jurisdictions, which have adopted the "totality of the circumstances" rule, as we do now, in 
determining whether the juvenile's confession is in fact voluntary. The rule is best expressed in 
People v. Lara, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586,432 P.2d 202 (1967): 
This, then, is the general rule: a minor has the capacity to make a voluntary confession, even 
of capital offenses, without the presence or consent of counsel or other responsible adult, and the 
admissibility of such a confession depends not on his age alone but on a combination of that 
factor with such other circumstances as his intelligence, education, experience, and ability to 
comprehend the meaning and effect of his statement. [432 P.2d at 215.] 
Those states which have adopted the totality of the circumstances rule** consider age, and the 
presence of parent, friend or attorney as only two of several factors to be considered in 
determining the capacity of a particular juvenile to waive his rights. Also to be considered are the 
child's intelligence or educational label, his state of mind during the interrogation; viz, whether 
he was confused or fearful, and his prior experience with the police and the criminal process. 
These factors must be taken into consideration as well as the questions of duress, threats, 
promises or other coercion traditionally considered in reviewing the confession of an adult 
defendant. 
In this case, there is no evidence of physical abuse, and no threats or promises made on the 
part of the police. Defendant was advised of his constitutional rights. He was nearly 17 years old, 
and the record shows that he was sophisticated and was not confused when he spoke to the 
police. The Juvenile Court, on the basis of his prior record in that court, determined he was 
sufficiently mature to be tried as an adult. The Juvenile Court's determination in that proceeding 
has not been challenged here. This record shows that defendant was not unfamiliar with police 
methods nor with criminal process. 
Under all of these circumstances, we hold that the Court did not err in determining that 
defendant's statements to the police were made voluntarily, nor in the refusing to strike the 
(c) 1992-1995 by The Michic Company 
officer's testimony on the ground that no parent, adult friend or attorney was present during this 
interrogation. 
Defendant's second point on appeal is that the policy were in violation of Section 78-3a-29, 
and that such a violation renders his statements inadmissible as evidence. That Section provides: 
78-3a-29. A child may be taken into custody by a peace officer without order of the court (a) 
when in the presence of the officer the child has violated a state law, federal law or local law or 
municipal ordinance; (b) when there are reasonable grounds to believe that he has committed an 
act which if committed by an adult would be a felony; (c) when he is seriously endangered in his 
surroundings, or when he seriously endangers others, and immediate removal appears to be 
necessary for his protection or the protection of other; (d) when there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that he has run away or escaped from his parents, guardian, or custodian. 
A private citizen or a probation officer may take a child into custody if the circumstances are 
such that he could make a citizen's arrest if an adult were involved. A probation officer may also 
take a child into custody under the circumstances set out in the preceding paragraph, or if the 
child has violated the conditions of probation, provided that the child is under the continuing 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court or in emergency situations in which a peace officer is not 
immediately available. 
When an officer or other person takes a child into custody, he shall without unnecessary 
delay notify the parents, guardian, or custodian. The child shall then be released to the care of his 
parent or other responsible adult unless his immediate welfare or the protection of the community 
requires that he be detained. Before the child is released, the parent or other person to whom the 
child is released may be required to sign a written promise, on forms supplied by the court, to 
bring the child to the court at a time set or to be set by the court. 
A child shall not be detained by the police any longer than is reasonably necessary to obtain 
his name, age, residence and other necessary information, and to contact his parents, guardian or 
custodian. If he is not thereupon released as provided in the preceding paragraph, he must be 
taken to the court or to the place of detention or shelter designated by the court without 
unnecessary delay. 
The officer or other person who takes a child to a detention or shelter facility must notify the 
court at the earliest opportunity that the child has been taken into custody and where he was 
taken; he shall also promptly file with the court a brief written report stating the facts which 
appear to bring the child within jurisdiction of the juvenile court and giving the reason why the 
child was not released. 
Defendant relies on the fourth paragraph of this statute. Defendant acknowledges that this 
statute is not meant to prevent the police from undertaking routine investigatory questioning of 
juveniles who are arrested. But, he argues, the interrogation during the six and one-half hour 
drive from Colorado was unreasonably lengthy. And he urges this Court to interpret § 78-3a-29 
to allow police interrogation only after a juvenile has been presented to the juvenile authorities. 
It is clear, in reviewing the entire statute, rather than the fourth paragraph in isolation, that it 
does not basically govern police interrogation of juveniles. The dominant purpose of the statute 
is to provide guidelines for arrest and either release or placement of a juvenile in detention 
facilities separate from adult facilities. The statute provides for arrest and detention of juveniles 
on four separate and dissimilar grounds; i.e., when a child has committed (a) a misdemeanor, (b) 
a felony, (c) is abused, and is in need of protection, or (d) has committed a status offense. Police 
interrogation must necessarily differ considerably in each of these four cases, and the four 
situations cannot be treated equally for that purpose. 
(c) 1992-1995 by The Michic Company 
Police interrogation must, of course, always be reasonable, and police must conduct such 
interviews in a responsible manner. Unnecessarily lengthy interrogation is suspect. But Officer 
Sharp's testimony shows that this interrogation was not abusive, intensive, nor indeed, very 
lengthy7 Defendant did not offer any evidence to the contrary. The six and one-half hour drive 
from Colorado is normal driving time, and was not in the circumstances of this case 
unreasonable. 
In sum, our comments here are not to be construed, of course, as reducing the vitality of the 
fourth paragraph of § 78-3a-29. Rather, these comments constitute interpretation of this 
paragraph in context with other language of the statute-and the key is that detention by policy of 
a juvenile for interrogation must not be more extended than is "reasonably necessary". 
Finally, defendant argues that the use of this evidence in the District Court is prohibited by 
the provisions of § 78-3a-44(3) and by fundamental fairness. 
Section 78-3a-44(3) provides: 
Neither the record in the juvenile court nor any evidence in the juvenile court shall be 
admissible as evidence against the child in any proceedings in any other court, with the exception 
of cases involving traffic violations. 
As defendant was not charged nor tried in the Juvenile Court for this crime, the evidence 
which defendant wishes to exclude was not presented there as evidence, nor was the Juvenile 
Couifs record presented in the District Court. Nevertheless, defendant argues that in Harling v. 
U.S., 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia interpreted a similar statute to exclude from use in an adult criminal court all 
damaging statements made by a juvenile prior to the time the Juvenile Court had waived its 
exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Circuit Court also stated therein that "fundamental 
fairness" required such exclusion. This determination, however, was made on the basis that under 
that Couifs applicable law, a juvenile was under the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court from the 
time he committed an offense, and was exempt from the criminal law unless and until the 
Juvenile Court waived its jurisdiction. As he was exempt from the criminal law, the 
constitutional safeguards afforded adult criminal defendants did not apply. 
In Harling, the Court observed that the constitutional safeguards afforded defendants in 
criminal proceedings would be wholly inappropriate for the flexible and informal procedures of 
the Juvenile Court which are essential to its parens patriae function.^  We believe this case lacks 
force as it was decided prior to Gault, supra, in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that 
juveniles are entitled to certain constitutional rights even within the environs of the Juvenile 
Court in spite of its status of parens patriae, and its focus on the best interest of the child. 
The Harling case has not been generally followed,^ and we do not believe our statute is as 
amenable to such a rule as that which the D.C. Circuit Court interpreted. The evidence sought to 
be excluded here was never presented to the Juvenile Court, and is not part of its record. Rather it 
is information obtained in the investigatory procedures of the police, who do not have a parens 
patriae relationship with a child, and are not viewed by him as such. 
The Oregon Supreme Court considered this question, and rejected the Harling rule on the 
basis that the police do not have a parents relationship with a child in State v. Gullings, Or., 
416 P.2d 311 (1966). There, the Court acknowledged that the integrity of the Juvenile Court 
might be threatened if information secured from the juvenile without regard for constitutional 
safeguards while he was under the jurisdiction of that Court were later used against him in an 
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adult criminal court. But there, as here, the evidence was obtained by the police during its 
investigatory process, and there, as here, the defendant was advised of his constitutional rights. 
There, as here, defendant had not been referred to the Juvenile Court prior to making his 
statements, and those statements were not, therefore, part of the juvenile court record, nor part of 
the evidence in the juvenile court. The Oregon Court said: 
So long as information is available which meets constitutional criminal due process standards 
and which was not secured through the close relationship between court worker and child, the 
safety and security of the law-abiding public requires its use in adult criminal proceedings. [416 
P.2dat314] 
We believe the Oregon rule in Gullings to be the better reasoned rule. In view of the age of 
the defendant, and other circumstances of this case, we hold that his statements made to the 
police were not made involuntarily, and the District Court did not err in admitting this evidence. 
Affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: 
J. Allen Crockett, Chief Justice, Richard J. Maughan, Justice, Gordon R. Hall, Justice, I. 
Daniel Stewart, Justice. 
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N.E. 2d 93 (1965). 
7 The officer's entire testimony concerning defendant's statements, again after the Miranda warning, 
was: 
Well, it was a long trip, it was about six hours long, six and one-half hours to drive back from Grand 
Junction. And the first thing I asked him, I said: "Gilbert, why did you get your hair cut? I noticed your hair's 
cut." And he says, "Well, I didn't want anybody to recognize me." And I said, "What about the nylon sock 
you had over your head at the armed robbery at Springville?" I said, "Shouldn't you get it down over your 
head?" He said, "No, I couldn't get it all of the way over my head." Also, I asked him, I said: "Why did you 
go back to the 76 station about a week later after the robbery?" He said: "I needed to use the phone there, 
had to go back and use the phone. I wanted to see if anybody noticed me." And I said: "I know you ran 
that night when the police showed up, and where had you run?" He said: "I ran up Hobble Creek/' I said: 
'You mean you stayed right in the creek?" He said: 'Yes. I was right in the water." He said: "I about froze 
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8 See Harrison v. U.S., 359 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1965), when it appears there was a conflict in the 
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